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The closely interlinked food, fuel and financial crises pose a significant new challenge to the global effort 
to reduce poverty. In short run, the oil-biofuels nexus was clearly the driving force behind the surge in 
food prices, but export restrictions and panic purchases turned a tightened market situation into a crisis. 
New evidence reveals that food prices rose sharply in many countries and that global poverty levels have 
increased markedly. The good news is that the supply response in many countries was strong. The 
impacts of the financial crisis on poor countries have yet to fully roll out, but it is clear that additional 
people will fall into poverty and become food insecure.  In the long run, there are strong indications that 
the global food system is fundamentally changing in a number of dimensions. Biofuels are here to stay, 
and energy and food prices have adjusted to a higher equilibrium, albeit with large volatility. Trade 
protection has also resurfaced, but so too have renewed investments in the agricultural sector. These 
fundamental shifts bring with them opportunities and risks that require internationally coordinated 
responses with strong national buy-in, as well as timely and relevant research.  










In the past three years, three successive crises have hit the world economy, albeit very unevenly. From 
2003 to their peak in mid-2008, the nominal price of oil quadrupled, prices of corn and wheat roughly 
doubled, and rice prices tripled in a matter of months rather than years (Figure 1). Just when food and 
energy prices started declining, around May 2008, it was becoming increasingly evident that a financial 
crisis of historic proportions was sweeping through the United States, western and eastern Europe, and 
Japan. By the end of 2008, it was also clear that the financial crisis was creeping into other sectors, 
notably trade, and that developing economies would also be hard hit. In 2009 most of the world’s major 
developed economies will be in recession, and virtually all economies will at least experience slower 
growth than in previous years. 
Both the commodity and financial crises took policymakers and experts by surprise. There were 
one or two early warnings about the food crisis, but for the most part the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and other expert groups sounded no alarm bells until prices were already rising 
quickly.
1 The financial crisis was slower in brewing, and subprime loans and complex financial 
instruments in the United States, in particular, certainly had their early detractors. This element of surprise 
was significant for two reasons. First, it meant that policymakers often had to make hasty responses. In 
some cases policy responses arguably made each crisis worse, notably restrictions imposed on food 
exports and “buy domestic” clauses inserted into stimulus packages. Second, since the research 
community was also caught largely by surprise, there has been little empirical research to provide much 
needed and timely advice.. It was also very difficult to assess the impacts of the crisis. A limited number 
of suitable household surveys were available to simulate the impact of rising prices on poverty, and when 
such surveys were available, appropriate data on the degree of price changes were typically absent.  
In 2009 we now have the benefit of some hindsight, especially with regard to the food crisis, 
though we still know relatively little about the developmental impacts of either crisis. So in this paper we 
attempt to combine hindsight and foresight. In Section 2 we try to reflect on the causes and consequences 
of the food crisis by augmenting existing reviews, particularly that of Headey and Fan (2008), with new 
data and new analysis. In Section 3 we turn to the ongoing financial crisis, although our focus is primarily 
on developing countries, and within developing countries, on rural and agricultural development. Section 
4 discusses the longer term implications of these crises. We discuss preliminary evidence of these trends, 
as well as the policy challenges that they present us with.  
 
                                                      
1 Two IFPRI publications raised concern that the trend of declining real food prices might well be over and that rising energy 
prices and biofuels demand could even cause an increase in prices (von Braun and Johnson 2005; von Braun et al. 2005).   
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2. FOOD CRISIS: WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW AND WHAT WE STILL DON’T 
KNOW 
In this section, we augment our previous research (Headey and Fan 2008) with an analysis that includes 
the most recent data on prices, trade, and production, much of which can be found in a much longer 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Food Policy Review piece (Headey and Fan, 
forthcoming). 
In our earlier review, we emphasized the size of commodity price changes, their speed, their 
scope (i.e., food, energy, cash crops, minerals, and the U.S. dollar), their timing, and their variation, and 
we will again make reference to these stylized facts in the discussion throughout. A new fact is that by 
March 2009, prices of staple grains had fallen by 30 percent from their peak in May 2008, while energy 
prices fell by around 50 percent, before stabilizing and recently increasing. This fact is indicative of a 
bubble (or “overshooting”), which encourages us to distinguish between the initial factors that caused the 
price surge and the exacerbating factors that turned tight markets into crisis markets. We define plausible 
initial factors as those that triggered the initial rise of food prices, while exacerbating factors are those that 
followed and that made things worse. Indeed, our hypothesis is that tight markets turn into crisis markets 
because when prices initially rise, market players often violate the self-correcting laws of supply and 
demand: Producers do not supply more, and consumers do not demand less. Eventually, of course, such 
behavior is unsustainable: Even a “perfect storm” must eventually peter out. 
 Figure 1. Trends in the nominal prices of cereals and oil: January 2003 to May 2009 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors from IMF (2009). All prices are deflated by the U.S. gross domestic product deflator. 
Initial Factors 
Among the initial factors, it is now uncontroversial that the oil-biofuels nexus was the driving force. Oil 
prices rose before cereal prices (Figure 1) and can be linked to cereal production and trade costs, which 
might have raised U.S. cereal production costs by 20–30 percent (Mitchell 2008). Once oil prices hit $50–
$60 per barrel—which they hovered around in 2006 and 2007—biofuels production became economic 
when subsidies are included. Corn consumption for biofuels rose sharply as oil prices rose, to the point 
















































































































































glance at Figure 1 shows that corn prices move quite closely with oil prices from early 2007 onward.
2 A 
number of simulation studies cited in the reviews above also suggest biofuels were a major factor in corn 
markets and significantly contributed to higher prices in substitute products. And if there was any doubt, 
recent FAO data put that doubt to bed: Biofuels demand accounted for 60 percent of the global change in 
demand for wheat and coarse grains over 2005–2007 (Table 1), with around 90 percent of that biofuels 
demand coming from the U.S. market.
3 
Table 1 also rejects a common  hypothesis in explanation of the crisis: changing diets in fast-
growing Asian countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia. Asia’s changing diet was a research topic 
before the crisis, and it is presumably for this reason that it was quickly drawn upon as a likely cause of 
the crisis, as well as for political expediency of deflecting blame away from Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) biofuels policies. Food and feed demand account for 25 and 15 
percent, respectively, of wheat and coarse grain demand growth over 2005–2007. Neither change is much 
above trend, and China, India, and Indonesia account for only 8 percent of the increase in global demand 
over that period. Yet even this 8 percent grossly overstates the impact on prices because China and India 
are essentially self-sufficient in cereals (typically they are exporters), and Indonesia has actually 
substantially reduced its cereal imports in the last five years. Moreover, the change in diets in these 
countries is away from cereals toward meat, dairy, and seafood. Coarse grains are obviously a component 
of meat and dairy production, but the growth in meat demand is hardly large enough to have induced the 
crisis, and meat prices have not risen anywhere near as much as cereal prices.  
Table 1. Changes in demand for wheat and coarse grains: 2005–2007 (millions of metric tons) 
Uses  2005 level  2007 level  Change  % of total change 
Food  642 662  20  25.3 
Feed  749 761  12  15.2 
Other  186 186  0  0.0 
Biofuels  46 93  47  59.5 
Total  1,623 1,702  79  100 
Source: Calculated by the authors from OECD-FAO (2009). 
 
As for other initial factors, there are good grounds to dismiss production shortfalls as a significant 
cause of the crisis. The widely cited decline in cereal yields (ADB 2008; IRRI 2008; von Braun and 
Torero 2009a) is largely driven by the slowing down of Asia’s Green Revolution. Headey and Fan 
(forthcoming) examine global production and trade trends and find that although per capita cereals 
production at a global level declined in recent decades, most of this slowdown was due to declines in the 
former Communist countries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). However, the former Communist 
countries have actually increased their exports since the fall of the Berlin wall, so we conclude that their 
production decline is not a compelling explanation for rising international prices.  
Droughts and poor harvests in Australia, India, and Ukraine may have tightened wheat markets 
and added 50 percent to international prices, all else being equal (Headey and Fan, forthcoming). But all 
else was not really equal because these poor harvests were compensated by strong harvests elsewhere, 
                                                      
2 Headey and Fan (forthcoming) also show that the diversion of U.S. maize to biofuels is equivalent in size to the diversion of 
U.S. exports to the Communist countries in 1972–74, which was cited as the major cause of the 1974 food crisis. 
3 We also note that the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook runs simulations predicting food prices from 2005 to 2017 (see p. 50), 
including a series of experiments run on the model to show the sensitivity of cereal prices to various drivers.  Specifically, the 
outlook predicts changes in food prices in a baseline model and then adjusts five different assumptions in the model regarding the 
following: biofuels, oil prices, income growth in five emerging economies (EE5: China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and South 
Africa), U.S. dollar appreciation, and yield growth. While not specifically an analysis of what drove prices in 2005–2008, that 
model shows that biofuels and oil prices are the main drivers of price variation in corn and wheat markets, with dollar 
depreciation a midsize factor, and EE5 growth a minor factor.  
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such that the global reduction in stocks was not large by historical standards. The declining stocks 
explanation should also be treated cautiously, as this was rational decisions to reduce costly excess stocks 
in China (Headey and Fan 2008). These factors can therefore only be thought of as auxiliary factors: The 
oil-biofuels nexus was undoubtedly the driving factor.  
Exacerbating Factors 
Given the broader financial turmoil in the United States and elsewhere, it is not surprising that financial 
market speculation was widely cited as an exacerbating factor in the crisis, if not a deep cause, given that 
speculation rose in the context of rising oil prices too. Hence these bubbles could have common causes, or 
one bubble could have caused another.  
A common cause hypothesized by Jeffrey Frankel (1984, 2006) relates interest rates to the 
overshooting of commodity prices. When interest rates are low, money can flow out of interest-bearing 
instruments and into commodities, causing real commodity prices to rise more than other prices because 
other prices are “sticky.” However, stocks of commodities would be expected to increase according to 
this theory, whereas the available evidence suggests that this is not the case. However, the portfolio shift 
toward commodity markets provides some basis for the hypothesis that speculative activity in commodity 
markets affected spot prices. Commodity market experts seem to strongly disagree on this point, 
however.
4 Some recent research by Robles and Cooke (forthcoming) also found that lagged indicators of 
“speculation” (or noncommercial positions) seem to predict monthly movements in cereal spot prices. 
One problem here is that time series econometric techniques may not be very suitable for explaining 
commodity price changes.
5 A second caveat is more theoretical: There is still considerable skepticism of 
the idea that futures prices might play an important role in the formation of spot prices. Sellers of 
commodities would have to use futures prices as their primary benchmark, but if buyers of commodities 
thought prices were falsely inflated, they could refuse to pay these prices in what are normally thought of 
as highly competitive markets. Rescuing the speculation hypothesis would therefore require either 
imperfect information or highly inelastic demand. Both of these are possible, but contentious. 
Perhaps the greater weakness of the speculation argument is that there are much more tangible 
explanations of export prices that leave little room for speculation to have had a large impact on spot 
prices. In addition to the oil-biofuels explanations for corn markets—which fits the timing of corn price 
increases—droughts, export restrictions, and panic purchases are a potentially potent explanation for late 
and much sharper increases in wheat and rice markets (moreover, financial speculation for rice is largely 
irrelevant).
6 In the case of wheat, an initial tightening of the market was probably brought on by droughts 
in Australia, India, and the Ukraine in 2006 and 2007 (observe the gradual rise in wheat prices from mid-
2005 to mid-2006), and then by the Ukraine government’s announcement of a grain export ban in March 
2007, which coincided almost exactly with the surge in rice prices that continued until February of 2008. 
As a result of these policies, Ukraine grain exports in 2007 were 77 percent lower than 2006, and many of 
the Ukraine’s largest grain clients switched entirely to other grain markets (Dollive 2008), including 
Russia and Kazakhstan, where stocks-to-use ratios soon halved. By early 2008 both of these countries had 
implemented export restraints to protect prices in their domestic markets. Argentina also closed its 
exports registry in March of 2007 and continued to meddle with cereal markets over the next year, which 
led to sharp and observable run-ups in Argentine export prices (Headey and Fan, forthcoming). In recent 
work we estimate that these factors might have led to a 50 percent rise in wheat prices (Headey 2009).  
                                                      
4 For example, see Masters (2008) on the case for speculation affecting spot prices. Various Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission publications and testimonies have tended to adopt the opposite position, until recently. See Harris (2008), for 
example. 
5 Here we are thinking of the usual issues of parameter stability, causality, and misspecification. Misspecification may be most 
severe, because price formation may be driven by factors that are very difficult to measure, such as expectations.   
6 That said, Dollive (2008) presents some evidence that China’s restrictions of maize exports diverted the world’s second largest 
corn importer, South Korea, toward already tight U.S. corn markets  
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The case of rice is far more dramatic. Rice is unusual in being heavily produced by smallholders 
and heavily consumed by millions of people (Timmer 2009). This, in turn, means that rice is very 
important to numerous governments, and therefore subject to a variety of trade distortions and a 
commensurately thin share of world cereals trade. Hence the scope for hoarding, precautionary (panic) 
purchases, and export bans to sharply impact prices can scarcely be overemphasized. Indeed, from August 
2005 until November 2007, rice prices increased steadily, but there were certainly no signs of a crisis (see 
Figure 1). Yet from November 2007 to May 2008, rice prices doubled. This is essentially because the rice 
market self-imploded (Figure 2). A relatively modest increase in prices in October and November of 
2007, combined with a poor wheat harvest and surging international demand for Indian rice, prompted 
India to impose the first major export restriction on rice in November 2007.  
India’s export ban had three effects. First, India is a major rice exporter, accounting for about 20 
percent of world exports in the years before the crisis, making it the second-biggest exporter after 
Thailand (32 percent), and just ahead of Vietnam (18 percent). This meant that the forced diversion of its 
clients to other rice exporters was a major shock to the world rice market. Figure 3 shows the drop in 
Indian rice exports to various client countries, especially the Middle East, as well as Nigeria and other 
African countries. The second effect of India’s ban was to drive up prices and spread panic among other 
rice-consuming nations. This led to export restrictions in Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and Egypt and large 
panic purchases by countries like the Philippines, which imported more in just the first four months of 
2008 than it did in all of 2007 (Figure 2).  
Figure 2.  The effects of export restrictions on rice 
   
Source: Authors’ construction based on the collation of various media articles. 






































































































































































































































) Jun: Japan allowed to 
reexport rice stocks 
Q1: Saudi imports from 
Thailand rise by nearly 90% 
after India’s ban  
Jan: Vietnam & Egypt 
restrict exports, China 
imposes export taxes 
Strong demand from energy 
exporters keeps rice prices 25-
30% above 2007 levels 
Jan-Feb: Drought in Iran 
leads it to order 0.8 
million mt of Thai rice
Nov: India bans exports 
after a bad wheat harvest
Sep: India lifts export 




Jan-Apr: Philippines buys 
normal annual quota in just 
4 months, rolls back tariffs 
Jun: Cambodia 
removes ban 
Jun: Egypt announces 
export of rice from Sep. 
Apr: Nigeria scraps 100% tariffs & 
imports 0.5 million mt Thai rice.   
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Figure 3. Changes in Indian rice exports by destination: 2004–2008 
 
Source: Department Of Commerce, government of India. http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/Default.asp 
Notes: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. 
 
The difference between rice and other international grains is that India was a big fish in a small 
pond. In recent work (Headey 2009), we estimate the impact of these export bans and panic purchases on 
international prices using Timmer’s (2009) model of rice price formation.
7 Basically we shock this model 
with a series of counterfactuals to see what would have happened to prices had countries continued with 
their precrisis trade behavior. Note that for India we again carry out these calculations after excluding 
Indian exports to Bangladesh, because India excluded Bangladesh from its export ban (i.e., we treat such 
trade as “domestic”). Table 2 shows that world exports in the fiscal year 2007-2008 would have been 7 
percent higher had India kept its 2006-2007 exports unchanged, which we estimate would have resulted in 
international prices that were 50 percent lower than their actual levels. Import surges from the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, and oil exporters were also large—all imported around a million more than they 
did in 2006–2007—and each surge could have raised rice prices by 20–30 percent. Summing up these 
individual effects, we find that they appear to explain a 106 percent increase in world rice prices in 2007-
2008,
8 as compared to the actual increase in export prices, which was around 115 percent from July 2007 
to June 2008. Export restrictions and panic purchases can therefore account for the majority of the 
increase in rice prices. 
  
                                                      
7 For brevity we omit the derivation of the model and simply present the final short-run version of the model, which is  pt = (bt-
at)/SR, where p is the percentage change in prices at time t; b and a are demand and supply shifters (such as export bans or panic 
purchases); and SR is the net short-run demand response, which is the difference between the short-run demand and supply 
elasticities, srd and srs, respectively. In the case of rice, demand for which is highly inelastic, Timmer (2009) assumes that the 
short-run demand response parameter (srd) is -0.10. Since rice is mainly produced by smallholders, the supply response (srs) is 
also expected to be low at +0.05. Hence the short-run supply response is +0.05, implying that SR = -0.15. 
8 Note that we avoid counting the Bangladesh surge twice, because we simply we calculate India’s export decline net of exports 
to Bangladesh. If we were to recalculate the price change due to India’s export reduction with Bangladesh included (i.e., 
recalculate row 2) and then recalculate the total changes in prices due to export restrictions and bans with Bangladesh’s import 
surge included, we would get the same result. The only difference is whether we attribute Bangladesh’s import surge to 
Bangladesh or to India. If we attribute it to Bangladesh, then India’s export restrictions are estimated to account for a 27 percent 
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Table 2. Estimating the contribution of “panic” to changes in rice prices  





























Q: 1000 mt  26,674 27,047  28,540 25,774 25,579 25,462     
Q: ￿%    1.4%  7.0%  -3.4%  -4.1%  -4.5%     
Price: ￿%   -9.4%  -46.6%  -22.5%  -27.4%  -30.3%  105.9%  117.0% 
Source: Authors calculations from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) data on exports and imports. Rice prices are Thai 
export prices reported by the FAO, with price changes depending upon the variety (Thai A1 Super and Thai 100% B). 
Notes: mt=metric tons. To calculate the potential change in rice prices, we assumed a net short-run demand elasticity of -0.15,as 
in Timmer (2009). a. Indian exports again exclude exports to Bangladesh. b. The sum of price changes excluded import increases 
in Bangladesh, to avoid double counting. c. Note that the actual change in prices refers to a low-quality rice, Thai A1 super. 
Higher-quality varieties experienced larger price changes. 
Consequences of the Food Crisis 
In our earlier review, we also looked at the complex impacts of the food crisis on developing countries, 
albeit with limited data (Headey and Fan 2008). The first issue we considered was price transmission. We 
noted that significant appreciations against the U.S. dollar buffeted many countries from more rapid 
transmission, although the strengthening of the dollar in late 2008 would have reversed this trend 
somewhat. Governments also used a range of other instruments for dampening transmission, include 
export restrictions, reducing import tariffs, releasing stocks, reducing value-added taxes, and so on. Other 
evidence also indicated that many less developed countries’ (LDCs’) current account balances were much 
more vulnerable to oil increases than food increases (Aksoy and Ng 2008; IMF 2008). Rising fuel costs 
could also have much more pervasive impacts on the macroeconomy because of multiplier effects (Arndt 
et al. 2008). 
Of course, the difference with food is that, relative to energy, it constitutes a much larger share of 
a poor person’s budget—as much as 70 percent. Moreover, household surveys reveal that a surprising 
number of poor people, even in rural areas, consume more food than they produce (Ivanic and Martin 
2008; Zezza et al. 2008). Ivanic and Martin (2008) even found that the adverse impacts of rising prices 
were larger in rural areas than they were in urban areas. A more concrete caveat has also been raised by 
Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008), who show that although many poor people are indeed net food 
consumers, most are very marginal net food consumers. Finally, there is the obvious caveat that most of 
the food price simulation work carried out in 2008 relied on very simple models in which it was assumed 
that households or the general economy did not adjust to rising food prices. General equilibrium models 
would normally include behavioral adjustments that mitigate the first-round effects of higher prices (see, 
for example, Arndt et al. 2008), although Warr’s (2008) analysis of Thailand still found large adverse 
effects in what was otherwise assumed to be one of the few countries to benefit from higher food prices. 
Our earlier review also found inconsistent results across three household simulation studies. On this basis 
it would appear that there are still a few puzzling results and inconsistencies that emerge from a close 
reading of these studies.  
Perhaps the most important caveat to these studies is that virtually all of them simulated the 
effects of assumed price increases rather than actual prices increases. This is because, at the time, actual 
price data were not available for most developing countries. The good news is that the crisis prompted a 
significant scaling up of local food price collection and dissemination by bodies such as the U.S. Agency 
for International Development , the World Food Programme (WFP), and the FAO , among others. The 
FAO (2009c) data set is publicly available and particularly useful for reflecting on what actually 
happened to food prices in the developing world in 2008. Specifically, it allows us to perform a 
commodity-level analysis of real food price trends for over 50 countries and a wide range of  
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commodities. While impressive in scope, the FAO data set is unbalanced in that different commodities 
are reported across countries, sometimes in wholesale prices and sometimes retail, and sometimes as 
processed (for example, bread) or semi-processed (for example, flour). Hence we report price changes by 
commodity (Table 3), and after adjusting the data for wholesale/retail and processed/unprocessed 
differences, we also report data by country (Map 1). 
Table 3 shows the average real price change for each commodity between a given month in 2008 
and the corresponding month in 2007, thereby taking account of seasonality. The statistics indicate that 
the real monthly prices of commodities were significantly higher in 2008 than they were in the 
corresponding months of 2007. Prices were highest for potatoes (51 percent, only five observations, 
mostly from Latin America), followed by sorghum (27 percent, only nine observations), maize and rice 
(around 25 percent), and millet (20 percent, nine observations). Wheat prices rose by only 10 percent, 
perhaps because wheat prices rose earlier than some other commodities (i.e., in 2007). Another important 
feature of Table 3 is that in all cases there was widespread variation in price changes.  
Table 3. Average monthly price changes from 2007 to 2008, by major commodity 
  # Obs  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Beans 21  9.4 15.6  -29.2 36.8 
Bread 11  9.8 10.4  -10.0 22.3 
Maize  42  35.9 81.8  -26.9  500.0 
Cassava 6  1.7 8.0  -13.1  10.0 
Millet 9  19.7 21.3  -6.3 68.5 
Potatoes  5  51.2 68.8 2.2  159.1 
Rice  44  24.3 23.6  -8.8 89.4 
Sorghum 9  27.0 17.4 3.5 62.7 
Wheat 14  7.8 18.8  -20.2 52.9 
Wheat (flour)  12  12.2 17.7  -9.4 52.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations from FAO (2009c) data. 
 
Map 1 shows the results of our effort to produce a relatively consistent comparison of real 
domestic price changes across countries by netting out seasonality, adjusting for commodity 
characteristics, and weighting commodities by their contribution to calorie intake.
9 Because of the 
unavoidable measurement errors of the data, we group countries according to broad categories—negative 
real price changes, 0–5 percent changes, 5–15 percent changes, 15–30 percent changes, and changes 
larger than 30 percent—and also identify countries for which relatively few commodities were reported 
(see the map’s notes). Most Asian countries for which we have data witnessed moderate price changes, 
although Vietnam and Thailand—two large rice exporters—witnessed large price changes in rice. India 
and Bangladesh actually witnessed lower food prices in 2008, suggesting that India’s export ban was 
effective in curtailing prices. Price changes were significant in Afghanistan and Pakistan and very high in 
Sri Lanka. In South America, price changes were modest and sometimes even negative, but a number of 
Central American countries experienced large changes in food prices. In Africa the story is complex. A 
few countries witnessed declining real prices, such as Zambia (whose strong currency might have reduced 
the cost of imports), South Africa, Cameroon, and Madagascar. However, many African countries 
experienced very large price changes in 2008, including some of the most populous countries, such as 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, and Mozambique. In several cases domestic factors 
were undoubtedly as important as international price transmission (monetary and fiscal policies in 
                                                      
9 See Headey and Fan (forthcoming) for more details of our approach.  
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Ethiopia and Malawi and conflict in Kenya and Sudan), and in some instances, these factors spilled over 
into tighter food markets in neighboring countries, such as Uganda (Benson 2008).  
If so many of the world’s poor really are non-marginal net food consumers with limited scope to 
adjust to rising prices in the short run, then the results in Map 1 suggest that 2008 was indeed a very bad 
year for world poverty (global estimates are discussed in the next section). But the news is not quite all 
doom and gloom, because one of the surprises of 2008 appears to be that the supply response to rising 
food prices was very strong, including in a number of large developing countries.  
Map 1. Some cautious estimates of price changes in staple foods over 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from FAO (2009c) data. 
Notes: Prices are in real local currency units, except in a few cases. The price series is an estimate of retail prices for unprocessed 
staple foods. See text for details. Countries with limited data include Rwanda, Zambia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Chile, Honduras, 
Pakistan, China, Uganda, Namibia, Costa Rica, and Nigeria. In these cases either monthly data for 2008 were incomplete, or the 
commodities in question made up less than 30 percent of dietary energy share. 
  
Table 4 reports the percentage change in the production of the three main cereals from 2007-2008 
to 2008-2009 using USDA’s (2009a) preliminary estimates. The table separates producers by those 
primarily producing for domestic consumption (especially consumer countries with large populations) 
and those in which a significant portion of production (more than 10 percent) is for export. Excluding 
outliers such as Argentina (troubled by a series of poor policy decisions and farmer protests), Australia 
(affected by drought), and Kenya (troubled by conflict), most major cereal producers—including both 
major consumer nations and major exporter nations—responded very positively. We find that major 
consuming nations increased production in this period by 16.8 percent for maize, 12.4 percent for rice, 
and 8.5 percent for wheat. As might be expected, the response from major exporting nations was even 
stronger, especially for maize and wheat production, which increased by 25–30 percent. Particularly 
strong was the supply response in China and India, both of which increased their public agricultural 
spending by around 20–30 percent in 2008. In several African countries where fertilizer subsidies are 
present, supply response was also significant. In Malawi maize production increased by 50 percent. In 
Nigeria maize and rice production increased by 17.9 and 30 percent, respectively. Ethiopia, where food 
inflation has been very high for several years, is also estimated to have experienced rapid growth in maize 
production in 2008-2009 (52.7 percent). Production increases in rice were more limited, perhaps because 
of the greater prevalence of smallholders, the very high dependence of Asian farmers on more costly  
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fertilizers, the briefer duration of higher prices in rice markets, and weak transmission to the farm gate. 
But overall, supply response was certainly strong and no doubt helped to reduce food prices in both 
international and national markets, especially given that many food importers sought to increase their 
stocks when prices became affordable again. Whether food prices will continue to fall, however, remains 
uncertain. As of May 2009, nominal wheat and oil prices seemed to be leveling off at their July 2007 
levels, while rice and maize prices had only returned to their October 2007 levels (FAO 2009a). In 
Section 4 we look at the medium-term projections for food and oil prices, as well as the potential for 
increased price volatility in the world food system. 
Table 4. Supply responses to rising food prices: production in 2008–09 relative to 2007-2008 

















Central America  12.2  East Asia  9.2  North Africa  -13.2 
EU-27  7.2  Central America  0.6  East Asia  17.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  18.6  Sub-Saharan Africa  20.2  South Asia  9.7 
Southeast Asia  18.5  Middle East  -13.9  Sub-Saharan Africa  25.8 
North Africa  4.9  South Asia  10.4  Middle East  -22.1 
East Asia  22.9  Indonesia  3.5  Bangladesh  -7.1 
Mexico  16.7  China  10.0  Ethiopia  41.6 
Peru  16.0  Brazil  2.2  Egypt  4.8 
Tanzania  17.8  India  10.9  China  17.6 
Congo (DRC)  -1.1  Bangladesh  8.5  Pakistan  5.4 
Malawi  47.9  Congo (DRC)  0.0  India  14.2 
South Asia  12.7  Ghana  -3.7  Uzbekistan  7.6 
Nigeria  17.9  Madagascar  12.7     
Ethiopia  52.7  Malawi  69.8     
Ghana  1.9  Nigeria  30.7     
China  23.3  Philippines  10.9     
Kenya  -20.2  Tanzania  29.2     

















Thailand   4.3  South America  4.1  Brazil  27.6 
Brazil  19.0  Southeast Asia  5.4  EU-27  16.8 
South Africa  34.6  Vietnam  5.1  South Africa  10.9 
Former Soviet Union   60.4  Egypt  6.1  Former Soviet Union  43.8 
United States  11.2  Australia  -81.3  Ukraine  92.6 
Ukraine  56.2  Thailand  8.0  Kazakhstan  10.0 
Argentina  -26.8  United States  -4.4  North America  18.7 
    Pakistan  20.7  Argentina  -44.9 
        Australia  2.3 
Average   
(excluding Argentina) 
25.3  Average  
(excluding Australia) 
5.1  Average (excl.  
Argentina & Australia) 
31.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations from USDA (2009a) data. 
Notes: Q=quantity produced. Major consuming (exporting) nations are those with export–consumption ratios of less than (greater 
than) 10%.  
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3. THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO AGRICULTURAL AND 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
In 2008 what had begun as a real estate bubble in the United States and other Western countries quickly 
mutated into a full-fledged financial crisis, which in turn spilled over into a far deeper sector-wide 
economic crisis. For the first time since World War II, the global economy is expected to shrink in 2009 
by 1.4 percent (IMF 2009). Most OECD countries have been hit very hard, although recent reports 
suggest that many could see their economies turn around sooner rather than later. For the LDCs, the 
impacts will vary substantially across countries based on differences in the degree of openness and the 
type of openness. This section will overview the channels through which the financial crisis will affect the 
LDCs, but will also pay special attention to the impacts on agriculture and poverty.  
Impact on Economic Growth 
Table 5 shows the latest (July 2008) International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections of GDP growth by 
regions and major economies.
10 For 2009 the projections show almost a 4 percent output drop in advanced 
economies, but a 1.5 percent growth in output for emerging and developing economies. However, this 1.5 
percent average hides huge regional variation. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow at that average rate 
(1.5 percent), but Central Europe, Russia, and Central Asian economies will shrink by 4–7 percent on 
average. In contrast, China, India, and other developing Asian countries will still experience strong if 
somewhat reduced growth rates of around 5–7 percent. Growth in the Middle East will fall sharply, but a 
rise in oil prices since December 2008 means that growth will still be positive at around 2 percent. Latin 
America, initially thought to be relatively robust, is now forecast to have negative growth rates, with big 
dips in Mexico’s output, and even Brazil’s. For nearly all countries and regions, positive growth will 
resume in 2010, although the pattern of variation across countries is projected to remain similar to that of 
2009. 
The bottom of Table 5 also shows trade and monetary statistics. For the advanced economies, 
exports and imports will drop by 14–15 percent in 2009 and will not substantially recover in 2010. The 
picture is less grim for emerging economies, although these average statistics again hide some variation. 
Oil prices are predicted to recover strongly in 2009 and 2010, but prospects for cash crops look less 
favorable. Still, inflation rates in most developing economies will fall sharply in 2009 and 2010 after 
rising oil and food prices pushed them up in 2007 and 2008.  
Migration and Remittances 
Millions of migrant workers in both developed and developing countries have lost employment and 
income, and World Bank estimates and forecasts of workers’ remittances show that these flows almost 
doubled from $164 billion in 2004 to $305 billion in 2008 (around three times the size of aid flows in that 
year).
11 But somewhat surprisingly, the World Bank forecasts remittances to fall quite modestly to around 
$290 billion before rebounding again in 2010 and 2011. This would seem to suggest that the remittance 
impact of the crisis is quite unimportant, although historical data on remittances is notoriously inaccurate, 
so it follows that forecasts must also have wide margins of error. Still, most other sources of evidence 
support the notion that international return migration is rare and that migrant workers are coping 
remarkably well given their difficult circumstances. For example, it now appears that the Gulf States have 
probably not been as hard hit as many first thought, although a recent Overseas Development Institute 
overview of 10 country studies highlighted 38.8 percent fewer Bangladeshis migrating overseas, for 
                                                      
10 The July 2009 update is generally more positive than the April 2009 Economic Outlook, especially for China, India, and other 
developing Asian countries. In contrast, growth rates forecast for Latin America, Mexico, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central 
Asia have been significantly reduced. 
11 Actually, the real differences in resource transfers between remittances and aid is surely much larger, given that aid flows 
include administrative costs as well as technical assistance and implicit transfers, such as debt forgiveness.  
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example (te Velde et al, 2009). In the Latin American context, a Pew Hispanic Center study conducted in 
the United States found that 70 percent of migrants surveyed had sent less money home in 2008 than in 
2007 (Sward and Skeldon 2009), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Meins 2009) found 
that the number of migrant workers remitting from the United States had declined from approximately 75 
percent in 2006 to 50 percent in 2008 and that Hispanic unemployment had risen to 10.9 percent (above 
the national average). However, the IDB also reports few signs of reverse migration in the United States 
and that overall remittances back to Latin America declined very little. Likewise, a Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute study shows that despite a drop of almost 50 percent in remittances from Russia to the region’s 
poorest countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), migration patterns to Russia continue to be 
strong and possibly have increased since the peak of the crisis in late 2008 (Marat 2009). Remittances in 
Central Asian countries can account for a significant share of revenues, such as in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, where they account for 45 and 27 percent of GDP, respectively. 
Table 5. The July 2009 update of IMF macroeconomic projections (% change, unless noted) 





World output 5.1  3.1  -1.4  2.5 
Advanced economies  2.7  0.8  -3.8  0.6 
Emerging and developing economies  8.3  6  1.5  4.7 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  6.9  5.5  1.5  4.1 
  Central and Eastern Europe  5.4  3  -5  1 
  Russia  8.1  5.6  -6.5  1.5 
  Other CIS  9.8  5.4  -3.9  3.2 
  Developing Asia  10.6  7.6  5.5  7 
    China  13  9  7.5  8.5 
    India  9.4  7.3  5.4  6.5 
 Middle East  6.3  5.2  2  3.7 
 Latin America  5.7  4.2  -2.6  2.3 
    Brazil  5.7  5.1  -1.3  2.5 
    Mexico  3.3  1.3  -7.3  3 
World trade volume (goods and services) 7.2  2.9  -12.2  1 
Imports      
  Advanced economies  4.7  0.4  -13.6  0.6 
  Emerging and developing economies  13.8  9.4  -9.6  0.8 
Exports      
  Advanced economies  6.2  2  -15  1.3 
  Emerging and developing economies  9.5  4.1  -6.5  1.4 
Commodity prices (U.S. dollars per unit)      
Oil  72.3   99.6   62.1   76.5  
Sugar  101.7 116.6 114.2 112.0 
Coffee  129.1 149.8 118.9 120.1 
Cocoa  126.8 166.6 161.8 123.0 
Tea 97.9  124.6  97.1  90.1 
Cotton 114.7  129.4  99.7  106.9 
Rubber 152.5  174.0  99.8  113.0 
Consumer prices      
Advanced  economies  2.2 3.4 0.1 0.9 
Emerging and developing economies  6.4  9.3  5.3  4.6 




Of no less concern is the potential fall in aid flows. Previous research has shown that both aid and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows tend to be procyclical in both the supplying and the receiving countries. In 
other words, downturns in OECD countries tend to reduce the supply of private and public capital flows 
to LDC countries, and LDC countries generally receive less aid and FDI in their own downturns (Bulir 
and Hamann 2003; Pallage and Robe 2001). A reduction in aid flows at a time when they are sorely 
needed would truly be tragic. While insufficient public spending in agriculture was not a direct cause of 
the food crisis (at least not in short run), the neglect of agriculture by both donors and LDC governments 
left many LDCs highly vulnerable to rising international prices because of their dependence on food 
imports and their high rates of malnutrition and poverty. Yet after years of neglect, aid donors, 
development specialists, and LDC governments have finally reached some consensus on the vital 
importance of agriculture for broader economic development. The surge in food prices virtually cemented 
the consensus: In 2008 aid donors committed around 12 billion extra to agricultural development (Table 
6), and still more was promised without being budgeted or was allocated to other food security 
expenditures, such as food aid. Developing countries such as China, India, and the Philippines also 
allocated more funds to agriculture, and African countries show preliminary signs of following suit (Table 
6). But there is now a real risk that the promises of 2008 may not be lived up to because the financial 
crisis will reduce total aid flows and realign the composition of spending in favor of social protection, 
especially in urban areas. While this protection may be needed, we argue below that it is important to 
recognize that rural areas are still poorer than urban areas in almost all cases, and that reducing food 
prices through agricultural productivity gains benefits urban consumers as well as the rural poor. 
Table 6. Examples of agricultural spending commitments in response to the food and financial 
crises (USD) 




Food Crisis Response: 2008 
(ag = agriculture) 
Agricultural spending in 
2009 (% total spending)* 
WFP  1.0  China*  ↑ food stocks; ↑ag budget 30%  106 billion (18%) 
FAO 1.0  Philippines*  Retargets rice self-sufficiency  622 million (10%) 
World Bank  2.0  Bangladesh* ↑ag loans, exports, food stocks  830 million (19%) 
AfDB  1.0  Vietnam*  ↑ag R&D, fertilizer subsidies  3.2 billion (36%) 
IDB 2.0  Indonesia*  ↑rural development funds  1.04 billion (17%) 
Other multilaterals    India  ↑ag budget by 80%  n.a. 
European Union  0.8  Kenya  n.a.  ↑32% to 3.35 billion (30% ) 
United States  1.0  Tanzania  n.a.  ↑30% to 506 million (7% )  
Japan  1.5  Uganda  n.a.  ↑25% to 131 million (5% )   
Other bilaterals  1.5   
Sources: Aid commitments are from Abbott and Borot de Battisti (2009). All other data are taken from various media sources. 
Notes: AfDB is the African Development Bank. *Note that for these countries we have reported the total fiscal 
stimulus response to the financial crisis. The African countries in question did not report an explicit fiscal stimulus, 
so we only note agriculture’s share in the fiscal 2009-2010 budget.  
Poverty and Nutrition 
An important question facing policymakers all over the world is “What is the effect of these crises on 
poverty and hunger?” Table 7 presents estimates of the poverty and hunger impacts of both the food and 
financial crises. We present these statistics because (a) the food and financial crises partly overlap, as 
food prices have remained relatively high in many developing countries since mid-2008, and (b) the 
comparisons are a useful entry point for a more conceptual appraisal of the impacts of these crises.  
14 
 
Particularly problematic are the poverty estimates of the crises. The FAO’s hunger estimates for the food 
crisis have the benefit of simplicity: They essentially extrapolate 2003–2005 undernourishment data using 
partial data for 2006–2008 on dietary trends.  
Poverty estimates of the impacts of higher food prices are much more complex for the reasons 
highlighted in the previous section and in Headey and Fan (2008). The World Bank (2009) estimates for 
the food crisis reported in Table 7 improve upon previous estimates because they use the Global Income 
Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) model for a much larger set of countries (73). But the model is still forced 
to make generalizations about changes in food prices, income effects, income spillovers, substitution 
effects, food consumption, and the poverty impacts in China (which is not included in GIDD). For the 
financial crisis, the estimates are even less accurate. Chen and Ravallion (2009) use poverty data for 100 
countries and extrapolate the effects of the crisis on poverty based on (a) differences between precrisis 
growth forecasts and more recent growth forecasts and (b) historical growth-poverty elasticities.  
One important qualification to such a technique is that agricultural and rural growth is typically 
more pro-poor than nonagricultural and urban growth, as Chen and Ravallion would undoubtedly be 
aware (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007; Ravallion and Datt 2002). Hence it is important to consider 
the sectoral implications of the crisis in developing countries. A second qualification is that the financial 
crisis is contributing to lower food prices and therefore potentially reversing some of the increase in 
poverty witnessed last year when economic growth was strong but obviously not pro-poor.
12 Given that 
agricultural production and food prices are obviously so important for poverty outcomes, a sharper focus 
on the prospects for agricultural development in the short to medium term seems highly pertinent but 
largely missing from the financial crisis literature thus far. 
Table 7.  FAO and World Bank estimates of the impacts of the food and financial crises 
Crisis  Food crisis  Financial Crisis 
Source  FAO WB WB WB  CR  FAO 




poverty Poverty Malnutrition* 
   Millions  Millions  % Change  % Change  Millions  Millions 
Sub-Saharan Africa  24  5.7  2.8  -0.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Latin America & Caribbean  6 0.7  0.3  -0.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Near East & North Africa  4 4.6  0.6  0.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Asia and the Pacific  41 120.5 7.3  3.5 n.a.  n.a. 
Developing World Total  75   131.5 n.a.  n.a.  53  125 
Sources: FAO food crisis estimates are from FAO (2009b) while the FAO’s financial crisis estimates are available online at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/newsroom/docs/Press%20release%20june-en.pdf. WB = World Bank 
(2009); CR = Chen and Ravallion (2009). 
Notes: *Note that the FAO’s financial crisis estimates do not strictly relate to the financial crisis, but to the increase in hunger 
from 2008 to 2009, which is also affected by high food prices and perhaps other events. Poverty always refers to a poverty line of 
$1.25 expressed in 2005 international dollars.  
Agriculture and Food Production 
Agriculture itself needs to be separated into cash crops that are important for generating export revenue, 
and food staples that are important in the incomes and expenditures of the poor. In Table 5 we saw that 
cash crop prices have fallen sharply since 2008. However, these price declines come on the back of large 
price increases in 2008, so the news on this front is not entirely calamitous. Moreover, the World Bank 
(2009) finds that the terms of trade movements for most poor countries will be favorable in 2009 because 
most LDCs are large oil importers. The only disconcerting news on this front is that export volumes of 
                                                      
12 A symmetric rise and fall in food prices may not reverse poverty, however, if the rise in food prices induces poverty trap 
dynamics—for example, if poor people sell off productive assets to finance short-term food consumption.  
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virtually all goods and services are well down in 2009 and that oil prices are increasing again and may 
rise more than cash crops.  
The outlook for food production is probably not so bad either. For producers of food, the 
relatively good news is that demand for food is relatively income inelastic when incomes are decreasing, 
so rural incomes may be better protected than urban incomes during the financial crisis. For consumers of 
food, the news is probably not so good, especially urban consumers. Essentially, urban consumers in poor 
countries were hit hardest by the food crisis, and they will probably be hit hardest by the financial crisis 
because of their greater vulnerability to downturns in manufacturing and finance. An examination of 
previous financial crises also shows that agriculture generally declines much less than nonagriculture in 
such circumstances, and sometimes even experiences positive growth. However, the variation in the 
outcomes in Table 8 is considerable, and the sample is skewed toward Latin America and Asia’s financial 
crisis. It is possible that at early stages of development, agriculture could be more or less robust. Most 
African food sectors, for example, are typically thought of as being neglected by the financial sector, 
which, in the current environment, could turn out to be something of a blessing. Agriculture can 
potentially also act as a source of employment generation, especially in land-abundant African countries 
with customary tenure systems in which return migrants can more easily access land. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that return migration to agriculture has some precedent in Africa. During the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, 
it was estimated that anywhere from 365,000 to 1 million Burkinabé emigrants returned home to Burkina 
Faso.
13 Flexible customary tenure systems, strong ethnic affiliations, and a booming cotton sector meant 
that most of these return migrants were absorbed into the agricultural sector (Kaminski, Headey, and 
Bernard 2009). In Asia return migration would generally be more difficult, given its tighter land supply, 
but return migration in China in 2008 and 2009 has actually been facilitated by the restrictions on the sale 
of agricultural land, which the government was considering liberalizing. It is also widely known that 
return migration was prominent during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, although to our knowledge there 
are no estimates of size, duration, or welfare impacts of these trends. 
Table 8. Patterns of agricultural and nonagricultural growth (%) in previous economic crises 
 Nonagriculture  Agriculture 
Indonesia 1998  -16.1  -1.3 
Malaysia 1998  -5.0 -2.8 
Thailand 1998  -12.1 -1.5 
Korea 1998  -5.8 -6.4 
Mexico 1982–86  -0.7 0.4 
Honduras 1982  -2.5 4.5 
Mexico 1994  -7.8 1.8 
Honduras 1994  -2.8 0.9 
Nigeria 1981–84  -3.8 -3.5 
Zambia 1998  -1.9 1.2 
Average  -5.85 -0.67 
Source: Authors’ calculations from UN (2009) sectoral value-added data. 
 
We close this section with a word of caution. Despite agriculture’s relative robustness, 
policymakers need to be careful about how they allocate resources for social protection and economic 
recovery. The robustness of agriculture is relative and will still vary on a case-by-case basis. First, cash 
crop producers have not necessarily done well in the last two years because food and fertilizer prices rose 
much more than cash crops in 2008 (e.g., cotton). Of course, many cash crop producers also grow food 
crops, but so far no research that we are aware of has documented their fate during the food and financial 
                                                      
13 See http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=399.  
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crisis. Second, before the events of 2008, it was almost universally true that rural poverty rates and 
absolute numbers were much higher than they were in urban areas. For example, in the Asian crisis, 
poverty rates in Indonesia went up by 54 percent in rural areas and 72 percent in urban areas, but this is 
largely because poverty in rural areas was twice as high before the crisis. And since the rural population 
was larger, there were about 40 million more rural poor in Indonesia after the crisis than there were urban 
poor.
14 Most African countries have larger shares of rural people and even higher rural-urban inequality 
(Sahn and Stifel 2003). The message here is that policy responses that only address the more visible 
problems in urban areas could potentially be regressive. 
                                                      
14  Calculations from POVCAL: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalNet.html  
17 
 
4. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: IS THE WORLD FOOD SYSTEM 
FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING? 
The energy, food, and financial crises have undoubtedly constituted major shocks to the world economy. 
Up until the early part of the first decade of this century, real oil and food prices had mostly been 
declining. But in oil markets, demand was quietly but easily outpacing supply. The supply and demand 
imbalance in food markets was initially much less dramatic, but the spillover of oil prices into cereal 
production costs was significant, and the biofuels spillover introduced a major shock into world maize 
markets. Thereafter rice and wheat markets largely self-destructed via export bans and panic purchases. 
The jury is still out on other factors, such as speculation, but it is difficult to see these as driving factors 
given the more tangible explanations listed above. As for the present, the bubbles in both markets have 
certainly burst, but the fact that commodities prices are still hovering around their mid-2007 levels and 
appear to be stabilizing (if not increasing slightly) signals that higher prices are most likely here to stay, at 
least over the next decade or so.  
Indeed, a variety of preliminary evidence indicates that we have entered a new food price regime. 
The OECD, the US Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency have all 
predicted that oil prices will be significantly higher over the next 10 years than they were prior to the oil 
peak in 2008 . The International Energy Agency also suggests that biofuel demand for grains could 
increase by 7.8 percent a year over the next 20 years (compared with 1.2 percent annual increases for food 
demand). If this prognosis is borne out, 40 percent of global grain production could be going to biofuels 
by 2030. The oil-biofuels nexus will therefore be a key driver in propping up cereal prices. Figure 4 
compares USDA (2009a) and OECD-FAO (2009) projections over 2008 through 2017, with each series 
measured relative to its average levels over 2002 through 2007. While the two sets of forecasts do not 
always closely agree, both predict that wheat and corn prices will be roughly 30–60 percent higher in the 
next decade than they were over 2002 through 2007. The major disagreement is actually in rice prices, 
with the OECD-FAO predicting rice prices to be 30 percent higher, while the USDA sees rice prices 
returning to the same levels as 2002–2007. But putting the peculiar market for rice aside, the projections 
clearly suggest that the world food system is shifting to a higher price regime.   
A second feature of the new system is high volatility, which the USDA and OECD-FAO models 
cannot predict. But what we do now know is that cereal markets are very vulnerable to any tightening, 
because demand for cereals is highly inelastic, supply response is potentially quite sluggish in the short 
run, and knee-jerk policy responses are always a strong possibility in countries where food is a politically 
important good. Moreover, trade negotiations seem a long way from finding any kind of multilateral 
agreement capable of seriously curbing beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies, let alone panic purchases. 
And, of course, climate change and the projected increases in extreme weather events could also heighten 
price volatility.   
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Source: USDA (2009a) and OECD-FAO (2009).  


























































































































































































































A third fundamental shift is the investment climate for agriculture. As we saw in the previous 
section, foreign donors and a number of large developing countries have been ramping up their 
agriculture expenditure in recent years, which marks a reversal of the long-term decline in such spending 
(Bezemer and Headey 2008). High food prices should also lead to an increase in private investment, but 
the most dramatic shift seems to be in the types of investment taking place. Here we not only have in 
mind biofuels investments but also “land grabs.” According to data collected by von Braun and Meinzen-
Dick (2009), China has attempted to procure at least 5.5 million hectares in Africa (roughly equivalent to 
the size of Croatia) and 1.24 million hectares in Asia for a combination of rice and biofuels (Table 9). 
South Korean companies have been attempting to procure almost 2 million hectares in Africa, while 
Middle Eastern governments and countries are looking at just over a million hectares in Africa, just under 
a million hectares in Asia, and about 250,000 hectares in Russia and the Ukraine. All of the actual or 
proposed land investments from Europe and the United States have come from private companies. 
Another pattern of note is that most of the deals by the Middle East and South Korea relate to staple food 
production (e.g., wheat and rice) and directly follow from the concerns during the food crisis about not 
being able to secure sufficient physical food supplies. In contrast, European and U.S. deals largely relate 
to biofuels. China’s investments are split among rice, biofuels, and other products.  
Table 9. Land investments (in 1000s of hectares) secured for agricultural production, 2006–09 
    Recipients  










  Middle East  1,063 924  247  2,234 
China  5,500 1,240    6,740 
Europe  198   699 897 
United States  400     400 
South Korea  1,990     1,990 
  Sum  9,151 2,164  946  12,261 
Sources: von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009). Note that the media reports collated by those authors do not always report the 
land area, so the statistics in the table are only provisional and most likely underestimate the land areas being negotiated. Note 
also that many of these deals are still under negotiation or being contested, sometimes bitterly (e. g., in Madagascar). For 
reference, a million hectares is roughly the size of Israel, and 12.3 million hectares is somewhere between the size of North Korea 
and Guatemala. 
 
Since these kinds of deals are relatively new and in many cases highly contested by local 
populations (e.g., Madagascar), it is still uncertain whether this is the beginning of a new trend or a 
process with limited prospects. In principle, such deals are consistent with comparative advantage in that 
land- or water-scarce countries with money and technological know-how can better exploit “surplus” land 
in countries that are poor and lacking in agricultural technology. Of course, one can speculate as to what 
the opportunity cost of these foreign investments would be vis-à-vis domestic development of these land 
resources, but in reality it is the politics of these deals that is most problematic, rather than the economics. 
Many of these deals are non-transparent and non-consultative government-to-government transactions in 
which the recipient governments’ rightful ownership of land is fiercely contested by local people who feel 
that they have legitimate customary rights to the land. Policymakers clearly need to find ways of 
bolstering both local and international institutions to ensure that the poor are adequately protected from 
exploitation.  
Finally, the global food regime will almost certainly see new institutions emerging out of this 
crisis, just as it did in response to the 1973-74 crisis (e.g., The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, IFPRI, and other Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research centers). In 
response to the 2007-08 crisis, the UN secretary general established the Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis, aimed at promoting a unified response to the global food price challenge. An initial  
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meeting was held in June 2008, attended by 181 countries and 60 nongovernmental and civil society 
organizations. The immediate response was to call for increased humanitarian assistance to those hardest 
hit by the rise in food prices, but medium- and longer-term means of boosting smallholder productivity 
and moderating price fluctuations through increased stockholding capacity and better use of risk 
management practices were also discussed. 
These worthy ambitions still face some significant challenges. First and foremost, developing 
country governments themselves must be committed to improving smallholder productivity. Governments 
played a key role in every facet of Asia’s Green Revolution, including land reform, research and 
development (R&D), extension, infrastructure investments, marketing, and macroeconomic policies 
(Bezemer and Headey 2008). Without significant and sustainable country-level commitments, another 
Green Revolution will be impossible. The good news is that a number of developing countries are 
recommitting themselves to agricultural development. Asian governments are once again investing 
heavily in agriculture and rural infrastructure (Table 6). A number of African countries are also scaling up 
their experiments with fertilizer subsidies and investigating other means of boosting agricultural 
production, but Africa must overcome daunting institutional and technological challenges to achieve its 
own Green Revolution.
15 The second challenge is more multilateral in nature. Biofuels, R&D, climate 
change, grain reserves, and trade practices are all complex international issues with strong public good 
elements to them. For the most part, they require coordinated multilateral solutions.  
Wise policy solutions also need sound research. At the moment there is something of a dearth of 
research on many of these issues. Biofuels, climate change, and some R&D issues are probably the best 
researched items on this list, although even these certainly merit an ongoing interest. For one thing, R&D 
issues are likely to become increasingly complex from a regulatory and trade viewpoint (e.g., the debate 
over genetically modified organisms), and as new technologies emerge. Probably the least well-
researched issue relates to the sorts of reserve systems and trade practices that could best minimize 
undesirable volatility while still promoting sustainable economic growth. This theme was very widely 
researched after the first food crisis (Headey and Fan, forthcoming), but so far these terribly important 
questions have scarcely been touched after last year’s crisis.
16 To be policy relevant, researchers clearly 
need to keep abreast of the times by improving our understanding of agriculture’s heightened 
vulnerability to events outside of agriculture (such as in energy and financial markets) as well new 
developments within agriculture (such as “land grabs” and other investments). Since all available 
evidence suggests that the world food system is changing rapidly, so too must we. 
  
                                                      
15 On the benefits of a Green Revolution in Africa see Diao, Headey, and Johnson (2008). Their paper also briefly discusses the 
costs. 
16 Some exceptions include von Braun and Torero (2009b), Wright (2009), and Abbott et al. (2009), but much more work needs 
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